



SecNDP: Secure Near-Data Processing with Untrusted Memory

Wenjie Xiong^{*§}, Liu Ke^{*†§}, Dimitrije Jankov[‡], Michael Kounavis^{*},
Xiaochen Wang^{*}, Eric Northup^{*}, Jie Amy Yang^{*},
Bilge Acun^{*}, Carole-Jean Wu^{*}, Ping Tak Peter Tang^{*},
G. Edward Suh^{*◇}, Xuan Zhang[†], Hsien-Hsin S. Lee^{*}

^{*}Meta, [†]Washington University in St. Louis,
[‡]Rice University, [◇]Cornell University


§The first two authors contributed equally to this work

“Memory Wall”




The scaling of the bandwidth of interconnections and memory, as well as the Peak FLOPS. As can be seen, the bandwidth is increasing very slowly.

“Memory Wall” and Near Data Processing (NDP)




CPU TEEs Today




- **Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)** provides strong *confidentiality* and *integrity* protection using hardware.
- Threat model:
 - The main processor (CPU TEE) is trusted.
 - Memory (including NDP PU) is untrusted.

CPU TEEs and Challenges

- Off-chip data is protected by encryption.
- Current memory encryption does not support computation over ciphertext, hindering the adoption of NDP techniques.




Contributions of SecNDP



- An encryption scheme that allows computation over ciphertext in the untrusted NDP.
- An integrity verification scheme to validate the correctness of linear operations in NDP.
- Demonstrate performance approaching to that of unprotected NDP.

High-bandwidth, low-power, secure near-data processing!

Background: Arithmetic Secret Sharing in secure Multi-Party Computation




MPC protects confidentiality from an untrusted party (untrusted NDP).


However, existing MPC scheme assume each party will use the same amount of computing resources and memory.

SecNDP Encryption

Encryption (in the processor)




OTP takes the address and a version number as inputs. On-chip AES engines can generate OTP efficiently in parallel with memory accesses.



Like the arithmetic secret-sharing in MPC, the sum of OTP x_e and ciphertext x_c is the plaintext data. We can do computation over x_c !



Computation using SecNDP

(in the processor)



(compute-intensive)
 No memory access required

SecNDP Engine



Untrusted Memory Computation on ciphertext

- (memory-intensive)
- Parallel accesses
 - Save memory traffic

- Integrity Protection: A linear hash function is used to verify the result of linear operations.
- Formally prove the security of the schemes.


Performance Evaluation of SecNDP

- Workloads:
 - Deep Learning Recommendation Model (RMC in the table) [58]
 - Embedding table lookups: memory-intensive, executed in NDP
 - Fully connected layers: compute-intensive, executed in the CPU TEE
 - Medical Data analytics, e.g., sum: memory-intensive, executed in NDP
- With enough AES engines, SecNDP's system performance is close to unprotected NDP while providing data confidentiality and integrity guarantee.

End-to-end speedup, with 8 NDP PUs.

	RMC1- small	RMC1- large	RMC2- small	RMC2- large	Data Analytics	
unprotected non-NDP	1x	1x	1x	1x	1x	
unprotected NDP	2.46x	3.11x	4.05x	4.44x	7.46x	
SecNDP	2.36x	3.02x	3.95x	4.33x	7.46x	
Existing CPU TEE	SGX-CFL	0.0038x	0.0037x	N/A	N/A	0.1738x
	SGX-ICL (no int. tree)	0.59x	0.60x	N/A	N/A	0.57x

Conclusions



SecNDP is the first work to enable a TEE to leverage the performance and energy benefits of untrusted NDP securely.

- We proposed an encryption scheme allow computation over ciphertext in the untrusted NDP.
- We proposed an integrity verification scheme to validate the correctness of the computation in NDP.

SecNDP schemes demonstrate performance approaching to that of unprotected NDP.

- Performance (7.46x speedup)
- Energy consumption (18% energy-saving)
- Accuracy (negligible impact)

Thank you!